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5 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Objectives for the Intelligence Community

1. The undated draft DCI memorandum to the President received 5 July 1973 now contains the following wording with respect to "E. The provision of intelligence and its utilization" and Military Intelligence:

E. The provision of intelligence and its utilization must enhance the formulation of the foreign military and economic policies of the U.S. Government and the planning for and conduct of military operations by U.S. forces.

To meet this goal I will, with respect to

Military Intelligence:

- have the Department of Defense identify the ten highest priority needs in the field of technical intelligence required by their planners;
- prepare for NSCIC approval in the third quarter of FY 1974 intelligence production programs in the areas of Soviet and Chinese military R&D and Warsaw Pact general purpose force effectiveness.

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2. As a first comment on the wording above, I would note that almost nothing in what follows E's introductory paragraph has anything to do with "military operations by U.S. forces," either the "planning for" or the "conduct of" same. Furthermore, I question whether that is an appropriate phrase for inclusion in a memorandum from the DCI to the President. For both these reasons, I would recommend ending the introductory paragraph at "U.S. Government." I would also agree with including "and implementation" and "political" as pencilled in on the copy given me.

3. With respect to DOD identifying the ten highest priority needs in tech intelligence: Nothing wrong with it, but it sure is small beer. Hardly seems worthy of the enterprise, to say nothing of the intended recipient and his interests.

4. With respect to the second item under Military Intelligence: There are two problems. The first has to do with the concentration on "Soviet and Chinese Military R&D and Warsaw Pact general purpose force effectiveness." This is a curiously circumscribed set of subjects to be singled out for emphasis by the DCI in a letter to the President.

--There is a great deal that doesn't fall under either "Soviet and Chinese military R&D" or "Warsaw Pact general purpose force effectiveness" that is of national significance in Military Intelligence.

--They include tactics, doctrine, and operational effectiveness of the strategic forces of the USSR and China, and of the UK and France as well; they include the readiness and force capabilities of the NATO nations and of China and the Koreans.

--One solution, then, would be to broaden it out to speak of "...intelligence production programs in the research and development aspects of strategic and general purpose weaponry, and the tactics, doctrine, and combat capabilities of strategic and general purpose forces,

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particularly with respect to the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries, the NATO countries, and China."

Secondly, I have grave reservations over the DCI appearing to promise the President that he would cause the Intelligence Community to "prepare ...intelligence production programs" if this is meant in any highly structured programmatic sense. The Community can through its mechanisms such as the NSCIC identify major issues of concern to national-level policy makers. It can establish priorities. But only those with the operational responsibilities and the resources for carrying them out can "prepare ...programs." To put my recommendations all together, I propose the following redraft of the second item:

"prepare for NSCIC approval in the third quarter of FY 1974 a comprehensive statement of the major substantive issues, and the priorities that attach thereto, for guidance of intelligence production on the R&D aspects of strategic and general purpose weaponry, and the tactics, doctrine, and combat capabilities of strategic and general forces, particularly with respect to the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, the NATO countries, and China."



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